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IRCA-Related Discrimination: Is It Time
to Repeal the Employer Sanctions?
In 1986, Congress enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act1 (IRCA) primarily to stem the millions of illegal aliens
streaming into the United States. The law shifted immigration policy
from an emphasis on border enforcement to eliminating the incentive
for aliens to come into the country. The strategy was to eliminate
employment opportunities for aliens, thus reducing the alien's strong
incentive to enter the United States. To implement this policy shift,
a major provision of IRCA makes it unlawful to hire or continue to
employ any illegal alien unauthorized to work in the United States.
The law provides stiff civil and criminal penalties to ensure compliance with this provision. This policy shift forced the private business
sector to enforce this new immigration law. Concerned that the strict
employer sanctions might produce discrimination against persons
who appeared foreign or who spoke with a foreign accent, Congress
prohibited employers from discriminating on the basis of citizenship
and national origin.
In March 1990, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued
its final congressionally mandated report on the implementation of
IRCA's employer sanctions. The GAO concluded that "a widespread
pattern of discrimination has resulted against eligible workers . . .
[and] it is more reasonable to conclude that a substantial amount of
these discriminatory practices resulted from IRCA rather than
not." 2 Citing the GAO report and other state and local legislative
studies, several congressman, ethnic groups, and civil rights groups
have called for the repeal of the employer sanctions. Others have
recommended reform rather than repeal.
This Comment explores IRCA's major provisions and discusses
how and why they have resulted in widespread discrimination. The
Comment then analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of keeping the employer sanctions and several reform measures. It concludes with a recommendation to repeal the employer sanctions as
the most effective means to eliminate IRCA-related discrimination.
1. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(codified in U.S.C. §§ 8, 7, 26, 42, 50).
2. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND
THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION (GAO/GGD-90-62) 71 (Mar. 1990) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT].
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Background

There were two major reasons for enacting IRCA. 3 First, the
millions of illegal aliens streaming into the United States were
thought to be causing unemployment and adversely affecting the
terms, conditions, and wages of employment for United States citizens.4 Second, the uncontrollable situation at the 'borders was threat-

ening national sovereignty. 5
IRCA completely overhauled United States immigration policy
in scope and strategy. It shifted immigration policy from an emphasis on border enforcement to reducing the incentive for aliens to
enter the United States. It has four major components that implement this policy shift.' First, it prohibits employment of aliens unauthorized to work.7 Second, it grants amnesty to aliens who had, without authorization, resided and worked in the United States. 8 Third,
it prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of citizenship
and national origin. 9 Finally, it provides for better control of the
United States border. 10
3. Catherine L. Merino, Note, Compromising Immigration Reform: The Creation of a
Vulnerable Subclass, 98 YALE L.J. 409, 409 (1988).
4. S. REP. No. 132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1985). This adverse employment impact
would especially affect low-income, low-skilled Americans. It would create a burden on the
directly affected families as well as on society in general because society indirectly supports
poverty and unemployment programs. Id.; see generally Alan K. Simpson, The Immigration
Reform and Control Act: Immigration Policy and the National Interest, 17 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 147 (1984) (providing a good history of the policy reasons underpinning 1RCA).
5. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650. In 1986, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) projected apprehension of 1.8 million illegal aliens, a substantial increase over the 1.2 million
apprehended in 1985. Apprehension levels exceeded one million in six of the nine years spanning from 1977 to 1985. Id. "Regaining control of our borders is an essential goal of any true
immigration reform. We can't fairly speak of ourselves as a sovereign nation if we cannot
responsibly decide who may cross our borders.
... Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1985: Hearings on S. 1200 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1985) (Testimony of Attorney General
Edwin Meese, i11).
6. TASK FORCE ON IRCA-RELATED DISCRIMINATION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE TASK FORCE ON IRCA-RELATED DISCRIMINATION I (1990) [hereinafter TASK FORCE
REPORT]. The Task Force was formed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(k)(a)(l) (1988) to review
each GAO report and, if the GAO found widespread discrimination, to make recommendations to Congress on how to eliminate the discrimination.
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1988).
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (1988). Amnesty was intended to reduce the size of a large and
vulnerable subclass. Applicants who could prove they had resided in the United States since
before January 1, 1982 qualified to apply for temporary, and later permanent, resident status.
Merino, supra note 3, at 410. Applicants had to show means of financial support. The amnesty
application period ended May 4, 1988. Merino, supra note 3, at 410 n.8.
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (1988).
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 note (1988). IRCA authorized appropriations for the INS of $422
million for fiscal year 1987 and $419 million for fiscal year 1988.

IRCA

AND EMPLOYER SANCTIONS

The employer sanctions are the cornerstone of IRCA.11 They
are the primary means to reduce the incentive for aliens to emigrate
to the United States. Congress recognized that aliens would continue
to illegally cross into the United States because of the nation's
"thousands of miles of unguarded borders, attractive way of life, and
respect for civil liberties." 12 Denying aliens employment opportunities, however, would reduce the incentive for aliens to risk illegal
entry. 3 By using the large private business sector to implement and
enforce immigration policy, IRCA would enlarge the scope of en-

forcement without incurring substantial cost to the government.1
III.
A.

'

The Employer Sanctions
Activities Prohibited by the Employer Sanctions

The employer sanctions prohibit three types of activity: (1)
knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens;" 2) continuing to employ unauthorized aliens;16 and 3) hiring individuals without verifying iden-

tity and authorization to work. 1 7 The first two prohibited activities
are relatively easy for employers to understand. They have not
caused many problems. But the third prohibited activity is confusing
to many employers.
The law requires all employers to verify the eligibility of all
workers hired or continuing to work after November 6, 1986 and to
II. MICHAEL Fix & PAUL T. HILL, ENFORCING EMPLOYER SANCTIONS: CHALLENGES
AND STRATEGIES 1 (1990).
12. FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, MAKING EMPLOYER SANCTIONS WORK: THE NEXT THREE YEARS 3 (1990) [hereinafter MAKING SANCTIONS WORK].
13. Id.
14. Fix & HILL, supra note 11,at 33.
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(I) (1988). Section 1324a provides in part, "It is unlawful for a
person or other entity to hire, or to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United
States-(A) an alien knowing the alien is an unauthorized alien.
...
Id. § 13a(a)(I)(A).
Unauthorized alien means an alien not lawfully admitted for permanent residence or authorized by IRCA to be employed. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l(a) (1991).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(2) (1988). This section provides in part, "Itis unlawful for a
person or other entity, after hiring an alien for employment . . . to continue to employ the
alien in the United States knowing the alien is (or has become) an unauthorized alien .... "
Id. The "knowing" requirement incorporates a constructive knowledge standard. Employers
have an affirmative duty to determine that their employees are authorized to work in the
United States under IRCA. New El Rey Sausage, Inc. v. INS, 925 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
The constructive knowledge doctrine should be sparingly applied so that employers are not
forced to avoid hiring a person with a foreign appearance. Collins Foods Int'l, Inc. v. INS, 948
F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1991).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (1988). This section is referred to as the employment verification system or paperwork requirement. An employer is not required to verify an employee's
documents until the employee commences employment for wages. Collins Foods Int'l, 948
F.2d 549.
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maintain records indicating verification.1" When an employer hires
an employee, the employee must produce a document establishing
both employment authorization and identity,' 9 or a document establishing the identity of the individual2 0 and a document evidencing

employment authorization.2" There are twenty-six documents that
satisfy the law.22 The employee must then sign a verification form,
"1-9," certifying eligibility to work and the genuineness of the documents presented to the employer.2 3 Employers are also required to
sign the form attesting, under penalty of perjury, that the documents
reasonably appear on their face to be genuine and relate to the individual who was hired. 24 The employer must retain the form and documents and make them available for inspection by the Immigration
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b) (1988).
19. List "A" documents include the following:
1.United States Passport;
2. Certificate of United States Citizenship - INS Form N-560 or N-561;
3. Certificate of Naturalization - INS Form N-550 or N-570;
4. An unexpired foreign passport;
5. Alien Registration Receipt Card - INS From 1-151 or Resident Alien Card
- INS Form 1-551;
6. Temporary Resident Card - INS Form 1-688;
7. Employment Authorization Card - INS Form 1-688A;
8. A re-entry permit;
9. Refugee Travel Document - INS Form 1-571; and
10. Employment Authorization Card which contains a photo.
8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(v)(A) (1991).
20. List "B" documents include the following:
1.A state-issued driver's license or state-issued identification card containing a
photograph;
2. School identification card with photograph;
3. U.S. military card or draft record;
4. Identification card issued by federal, state, or local government agencies;
5. Military dependent's identification card;
6. Native American tribal documents;
7. United States Coast Guard Merchant Mariner Card; and
8. Driver's license issued by a Canadian government authority.
8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(I)(v)(B) (1991).
21. List "C" documents include the following:
1.A social security number card;
2. A Certification of Birth issued by the Department of State - Form DS-545;
3. A certification of Birth Abroad issued by the Department of State - Form
DS- 1350;
4. An original or certified copy of birth certificate issued by a state, county, or
municipal authority bearing a seal;
5. An employment authorization document issued by the INS;
6. Native American tribal document;
7. United States Citizen Identification Card - INS Form 1-197; and
8. Identification card for use of resident citizen in the United States - INS
Form 1-179.
8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(l)(v)(C) (1991).
22. See supra notes 19-21.
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(2) (1988).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(I)(A) (1988).
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& Naturalization Service (INS) or the Department of Labor (DOL)
for three years from the date of hire, or one year after the date the

individual's employment is terminated." The law is extremely broad,
extending not only to the country's seven million businesses, but also
to employment transactions of individuals 26 and all situations where
an employer/employee relationship has been established. 7
B.

Civil and Criminal Penalties

IRCA establishes substantial civil and criminal penalties as
punishment for employers 28 who violate any of these three prohibited

activities.29 The penalties for knowingly hiring or continuing to employ an unauthorized alien are graduated: $250 to $2000 per worker

for the first violation,"0 $2000 to $5000 per worker for a second violation, 3 and $3000 to $10,000 per worker for a third and any subsequent violation. 2 Paperwork violations are not graduated and can
result in fines of $100 to $1000 per worker.3 3 The law also authorizes
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(3) (1988).
26. IRCA states, "It is unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or to recruit or
refer for a fee, for employment in the United States - (A) an alien.
... 8 U.S.C. §
1324a(a)(I )(A) (1988) (emphasis added). Accordingly, IRCA would cover an individual employing another individual to be a gardener or chauffeur. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l(g) (1991).
27. IRCA includes not only full time employment, but also part-time employment. The
rules exempt only "casual employment by individuals who provide domestic service in a private
home that is sporadic, irregular, or intermittent." 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l(h) (1991). The rules
suggest that a casual hire for a non-domestic job, such as a plumber modernizing an old
house's water pipes or a business hiring a temporary file clerk, will be subject to IRCA. Fix &
HILL, supra note I1, at 46 n.24. Employer sanctions also apply to religious institutions who
hire workers. The law is not an infringement on the Free Exercise Clause. American Friends
Serv. Co. v. Thornburgh, 951 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1991).
There are two major exemptions to IRCA. The first is independent contractors. This classification is determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account whether the contracts
work according to their own means and methods and are subject to control only as to results. 8
C.F.R. § 274a.10) (1991). The second exception is contract labor or services. 8 C.F.R. §
274a.5 (1991). The regulation suggests that employees provided by temporary services are the
responsibility of the company that pays the employee and not the company that contracts for
their services. Fix & HILL, supra note 11, at 45 n.23.
28. Any individual who exercises control over a company is considered an employer and
can be liable for civil and criminal fines. Steiben v. INS, 932 F.2d 1225 (8th Cir. 1991).
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(f)(1) (1988).
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(i) (1988).
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(ii) (1988).
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4)(A)(iii) (1988).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5) (1988). In setting an amount for paperwork violations, due
consideration is given to the size of the business, good faith, seriousness of the violation,
whether or not the individual was an unauthorized alien, and history of previous violations. Id.
These fines can have a substantial and possibly crippling effect on employers. John Morrell &
Co. of Cincinnati, Ohio received proposed fines totaling $345,125. Peidmont Quilting Corp. of
South Carolina was fined $580,000 for paperwork violations and about $5,000,000 in criminal
fines. The case was settled with the company's payment of $225,000 in civil fines and the
company chairman's plea of guilty to a misdemeanor and 119 felony counts. INS Hits John
Morrell & Co. with $345,000 in Proposed Fines, DAILY LABOR REP., Sept. 5, 1990, at Al0.
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the INS to issue a cease and desist order." '
IRCA provides criminal penalties for employers who engage in
a pattern or practice of knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens. a5 The
law does not define "pattern or practice," but the legislative history
defines it as "regular, repeated and intentional activities that do not
include sporadic or accidental acts."3 " The law contains a second
criminal penalty making it a felony to transport aliens into or within
the United States with the intent of concealing, harboring, or shielding them from detection in the United States.37 Prior to IRCA, employers were exempt from this law under the "Texas Proviso," which
specifically stated that employment and the incidents of employment
did not constitute harboring.3 8 Employers who transport or conceal
unauthorized aliens are now subject to felony prosecutions under
IRCA. 9
IV.

IRCA Provisions to Counter Employment Discrimination

IRCA contains several means to limit employers' liability and
reduce their incentive to discriminate against foreign looking and
foreign sounding applicants. These means include: requiring "knowledge" for the imposition of large penalties, assessing comparatively
low and ungraduated penalties for paperwork violations, and making
employers responsible only for determining if documents are reasonably genuine on their face."' However, these measures did not appease Congress or ethnic and civil rights organizations which were
concerned that the employer sanctions could lead to employment discrimination. Vilma Martinez of the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) testified:
For Mexican Americans and other Americans who share
the physical characteristics of persons thought to be undocumented, employer sanctions will exacerbate existing patterns of
The largest fine to date, $1.1 million, was issued against a Georgia peach harvester company
for knowingly hiring illegal immigrants. Lee May, Firm Fined 1.1 Million for Hiring Illegal
Aliens, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1992, at Al.
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4) (1988).
35. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1) (1988). The section provides in part, "Any person or entity
which engages in a pattern or practice of violations of [knowingly hiring or continuing to
employ an unauthorized alien] shall be fined not more than $3000 . . . imprisoned for not
more than six months . . .or both ...." Id.
36. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 59 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5663.
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1988).
38. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982) (repealed 1986).
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (1988).
40. Fix & HILL, supra note 11,at 37.
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employment discrimination. Well-meaning employers, fearful of
Government sanctions, will shy away from hiring us. Racist or

biased employers will simply use the fear of sanctions as an excuse to avoid hiring us. At the very least, employers untrained in
intricate immigration laws
are likely to err in their assessment of
41
who is undocumented.

Congress was also concerned that Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 196442 and 42 U.S.C. § 198143 did not adequately protect
victims of unfair immigration-related employment practices." To
prevent possible IRCA-related employment discrimination, Rep.
Barney Frank introduced an anti-discrimination provision. 5 Some
members of Congress"6 and the Reagan administration"7 believed the
anti-discrimination provision merely duplicated existing civil rights
law. 48 Despite several attempts to strike the anti-discrimination provision, it was enacted as part of IRCA.49
A.

Anti-Discrimination Provision
The anti-discrimination provision prohibits a person or entity

41. Employer Sanctions: Joint Hearings Before the Senate and House Subcommittees
on Immigration, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 149 (1981).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
43. It is established that § 1981 applies to state and private racial discrimination. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-72 (1976). In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377
(1971), the Supreme Court noted that § 1981 has been held to extend to alienage discrimination involving state action. The Fifth Circuit recently held that § 1981 does not prohibit private alienage discrimination. Bhandari v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 829 F.2d 1343 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 937 (1989).
44. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 70 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5674. Title VII does not expressly protect individuals from private discrimination based on alienage or citizenship status. Furthermore, in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), the Supreme Court held that an employer's refusal to hire
aliens did not violate Title VII prohibitions against national origin discrimination. Id. at 96.
Recognizing the limitations of Title VII, the Senate Judiciary Committee reasoned that:
It makes no sense to admit immigrants and refugees to this country, require
them to work and then allow employers to refuse t hire them because of their
immigration [non-citizenship] status. Since Title VII does not provide any protection against employment discrimination based on alienage or non-citizenship
status, the committee is of the view that this instant legislation must do so.
H.R. REP. No. 682, at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5662 (brackets in original).
45. Frank Amendment to the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983 (S. 529);
see HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, REPORT OF TEXT OF AND AMENDMENT TO H.R. 1510, 127-35
(Comm. Print 1984).
46. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 216 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5752.
47. H.R. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. I, at 110 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5714.
48. Representative Lungren stated, "I believe that existing national-origin civil rights
laws are sufficient protection for all from discrimination." HR. REP. No. 682, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 216 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5752.
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (1988).

96

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SUMMER

1992

from discriminating against an individual because of citizenship or
national origin. 50 The provision represents an expansion in civil

rights law regarding employment discrimination.51 First, it expands
existing national origin protection under Title VII to include firms
employing four to fourteen employees.52 Second, it effects the first
ban on employment discrimination 53 on the basis of citizenship status.54 Third, based on recent judicial interpretations, it includes the
"totality of the circumstances of the employment process" as a test

for discrimination.55 The provision states in pertinent part, "It is an
unfair immigration-related employment practice for a person or
other entity to discriminate against any individual . . . with respect

to the hiring, or recruitment or referral for a fee, of the individual
for employment or the discharging of an individual from employment."'58 Using Title VII case law to interpret the provision, the Ad-

ministrative Law Judges (ALJs) have expanded the provision to include the whole pre-employment process. 57 The ALJs reason that

this extension will reduce unnecessary employment barriers placed in
50. Id. The section provides in pertinent part:
It is an unfair immigration-related employment practice for a person or other
entity to discriminate against any individual . . . with respect to the hiring, or
recruitment or referral for a fee, or the individual for employment or the discharging of the individual from employment (A) because of such individual's national origin, or
(B) in the case of a protected individual . . . because of such individual's citizenship status.
Id. § 1324b(a)(l).
IRCA originally included "intending citizen" as opposed to "protected individual." Intending citizen was defined as an alien who "evidences an intention to become a citizen...
through completing a declaration of intention to become a citizen." Id. § 1324b(a)(3)(B)(ii).
This definition received a strict interpretation. In United States v. Todd Corp., 900 F.2d 164
(9th Cir. 1990), a corporation hired the plaintiff, an illegal alien, in 1976. A month before the
sanctions went into effect and illegal aliens could apply for "temp.orary resident status" to
indicate a declaration of intent to become citizens, the corporation demanded proof of legal
authority to work. Id. at 166. The plaintiff could not establish that she was a citizen or alien
authorized to work because the program to apply for temporary resident status had not
started. Id. She was fired. The court ruled that she did not qualify as an intending citizen
under IRCA and consequently, could not be discriminated against on the basis of being an
intending citizen. Id. at 167.
In response to this strict interpretation, Congress replaced intending citizen with protected
individual in order to provide more protection to lawfully admitted aliens. See 8 U.S.C. §
1324b(a)(3) (1988).
51. Fix & HILL, supra note 11, at 37.
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(A), (B) (1988). Title VII protections only apply to firms
that employ fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982).
53. Martinez v. Marcel Watch Corp., 1990 OCAHO LExIs 14, at *5 (May 10, 1990).
54. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(l)(B) (1988).
55. Valdivia-Sanchez v. Lasa Marketing Firms, No. 88200061. 1990 OCAHO LEXIS 12,
at *42 n.21 (Mar. 14, 1990) (emphasis in original).
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (1988).
57. Valdivia-Sanchez, 1990 OCAHO LExIs 12, at *42 n.21.
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the path of aliens legally residing in the United States.58
To enforce this provision, Congress established the Special
Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices 9
(Special Counsel) within the Department of Justice. This office is
responsible for investigating, issuing complaints, and prosecuting employment discrimination under the law.6" However, Congress mitigated the scope and effect of the provision by granting several
exemptions.
1. Exemptions to Anti-Discrimination Provision.-The antidiscrimination provision has five major exemptions that limit the

scope and effectiveness of its protections. First, unlike Title VII, the
provision applies only to discrimination in hiring, recruitment or re-

ferral for a fee, and discharging an individual.61 A strong argument
can be made that an employer, employing between four and fourteen
people, may discriminate against an individual in promotional opportunities, wages, vacation, and raises based solely on the individual's

national origin.62
Second, Congressional history portrays the provision as a complement to the employer sanctions.6 3 Consequently, discrimination
claims might only be actionable if discrimination resulted from an
employer's reaction to the threat of sanctions.64 But a recent ALJ
decision held that ALJs have jurisdiction over discrimination complaints whether or not they result from the enactment or implementation of the employer sanctions. 65 The ALJ rejected an argument
58. Id. The ALJs seek to eliminate reckless pre-screening of applicants. Discriminatory
screening might include submitting documents as a condition precedent to employment. Martinez v. Marcel Watch Corp., No. 89200085, 1990 OCAHO LEXIS 12, at *49 n.2 (May 10,
1990). Federal regulations provide that a new employee unable to provide the requisite documents within three business days has twenty-one business days to produce them, provided the
employee presents a receipt for the application for the documents within three business days of
the hire. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(l)(vi) (1991).
In Collins Foods Int'l, Inc. v. INS, 948 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1991), the court, in dicta,
warned that employers should verify documents after extending an offer of employment to
avoid a claim of discrimination either under a civil rights statute or under IRCA.
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c)(1) (1988). The Special Counsel is appointed by the President
for a four year term. Id.
60. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c)(2) (1988).
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(l) (1988).
62. THE NEW SIMPSON-RODINO IMMIGRATION LAW OF 1986, at 167 (S. Mailman ed.
1986).
63. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE. HR. CONF.
REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5840, 5842.
64. Frederic J. Bendremer & Lisa A. Heiden, Comment, The Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices Provision: A Modicum of Protection Against National Origin
and Citizenship Status Discrimination, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1025, 1038 (1987).
65. United States v. Mesa Airlines, Nos. 88200001, 88200002, 1989 OCAHO LEXIS 15,
at *12 (July 24, 1989), petition for review denied, 951 F.2d 1186 (10th Cir. 1991).
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that only discrimination arising in the context of employer sanctions
is actionable.66 The ALJ conceded that the anti-discrimination provision was enacted to offset the effect of the sanctions.6 7 However,
IRCA provides that if the anti-discrimination provision were found
either unnecessary or too burdensome to employers, it alone would
be repealed, demonstrating the provision's independence.6 8
Third, under national origin discrimination, IRCA allows discrimination if it is covered under Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964.69 Section 703 exempts discrimination based on a "bona fide
occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." ' Congress
may have created a language bona fide occupational qualification in
IRCA. In an explanatory note, the Conference Committee stated
that "nothing in this bill shall prevent the use of language as a bona
fide Occupational Qualification." 7
Fourth, IRCA permits qualified citizenship discrimination in order to promote the interests of United States citizens.7 2 The law allows an employer to hire a United States citizen over a non-citizen if
both are equally qualified. IRCA also does not prohibit citizenship
discrimination if United States citizenship is required by law, regulation, or executive order. 4
Finally, the law exempts employers that have three or less employees. 7 5 Congress may have provided this provision to exempt individuals who hire casual household help, but includes many small
businesses .7 s Nevertheless, this exemption creates a class of employ66. Id. at *11.
67. Id. at *10.
68. Id. at *11. The ALJ reached the opposite result in Martinez v. Marcel Watch Corp.,
No. 89200085, 1990 OCAHO LEXIS 14, at *53 (May 10, 1990). The ALJ based his decision
on the Congressional Conference report, which stated that the anti-discrimination provision
only provides protection while the employer sanctions are in effect. JOINT EXPLANATORY
STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, HR. CONF. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 87 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5840, 5842.
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(B) (1988).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1982).
71. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5840, 5843.
72. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(4) (1988).
73. Id. In United States v. Mesa Airlines, Nos. 88200001, 88200002, 1989 OCAHO
LExIs 15 (July 24, 1989), petition.for review denied, 951 F.2d 18li6 (10th Cir. 1991), a company's policy of only hiring United States citizens so long as there was an ample supply of
qualified citizens did not fall under this exemption. There must be a simultaneous comparison
of qualifications between the citizen and non-citizen. Id. at *78.
74. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(C) (1988).
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(2)(A) (1988).
76. Linda S. Johnson, Comment, The Antidiscrimination Provision of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1059, 1092 (1988).
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ers that are free to discriminate."
B.

The GAO Reports

Another measure Congress adopted to counteract possible
IRCA-related discrimination required the GAO to issue three annual reports to Congress on the status of IRCA's implementation. 78

These reports were required to determine whether IRCA: (1) created an unnecessary regulatory burden on employers; 79 (2) was car-

ried out satisfactorily; 8 and (3) resulted in a pattern of discrimination against eligible workers. 8 If the GAO found that a widespread

pattern of discrimination8" had resulted solely from IRCA and Congress adopted the report's findings by joint resolution within thirty
days from date of publication, the employer sanctions would auto8a
matically be repealed .
The GAO's first two reports8 4 did not establish that the sanctions provision had caused a widespread pattern of discrimination. In
the second report, however, the GAO estimated that 528,000 or sixteen percent of employers increased unfair employment practices.8 1

The GAO did not classify this as a widespread pattern because it
was unsure whether the employers began these practices as a result

of the law and was unsure of how many eligible workers were affected.86 By the publication of the third report, the GAO was sure
77. Id.
78. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(j) (1988).
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(J)(1)(C) (1988). The GAO considered IRCA "unnecessary" if it
could be proven that the law was ineffective in significantly reducing the employment of unauthorized aliens or the flow of unauthorized aliens into the United States. GAO REPORT, supra
note 2, at 102. The GAO found that IRCA had reduced illegal immigration and employment.
GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 102. This finding is now in dispute.
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(j)(l)(A) (1988). The INS and DOL satisfactorily carried out
IRCA by developing plans and policies and implementing procedures reasonably expected to
identify and fine violators .and educate employers about their legal requirements. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 87. The GAO found that the two agencies had carried out the law
satisfactorily. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 87.
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1324aj)(I)(B) (1988); see infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
82. According to the GAO, a widespread pattern of discrimination exists if the sanctions
cause a serious pattern of discrimination rather than just a few isolated cases of discrimination. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 24.
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(1)(I) (1988). Joint Resolutions were introduced in the Senate, SJ.
RES. 280, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) and the House of Representatives, H.R.J. RES. 534,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); H.R.J. RES. 536, 101st Cong, 2d Sess. (1990), but they never
made it to the floor for a vote.
84. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMMIGRATION REFORM: STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING
EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AFTER ONE YEAR (GAO/GGD-88-14) (Nov. 1987); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. IMMIGRATION REFORM: STATUS OF IMPLEMENTING EMPLOYER SANCTIONS

(GAO/GGD-89-16) (Nov. 1988) [hereinafter SECOND GAO REPORT].
85. SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 84, at 46.
86, SECOND GAO REPORT, supra note 84, at 39.
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that the employer sanctions were causing a widespread pattern of
discrimination.
V.

Evidence of IRCA-Related Discrimination

A.

The Third GAO Report

The GAO issued its final report in March 1990, finding widespread discrimination against eligible workers. Based on employer
surveys,8 7 the GAO estimated that nineteen percent of the 4.6 million employers represented began discriminatory practices as a result
of the law. 88 Ten percent began practices that represent national origin discrimination,8 9 and nine percent practiced a form of citizenship
discrimination. 90 The GAO described three patterns of IRCA-related discrimination: 1) application of the employment verification
system only to persons of foreign appearance or accent; 2) nonacceptance of valid documents; and 3) adoption of exclusionary hiring
practices.9 1
A substantial number of employers only demanded and checked
documents of persons they suspected of being unauthorized aliens
because of a foreign appearance or a foreign accent.9 2 IRCA prohibits selective application of the employment verification system.9 3 If
those individuals with a foreign appearance or a foreign accent are
required to produce documents that a non-foreign applicant is not
required to produce, it might result in the denial of employment to
the applicant who appears foreign. 9 Moreover, the additional burden placed on these individuals because of appearance or accent constitutes discrimination.9 5
The GAO did not specifically address employers' nonacceptance
of documents, but fifty-five percent of IRCA-related Office of Special Counsel charges and fifty-two percent of Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission charges related to an employer's refusal to
accept an individual's documents. 96 Many employers began a prac87. The GAO mailed questionnaires to 9,491 businesses. They also conducted a followup mailing and telephoned employers that failed to respond. The survey has a 95% confidence
level, plus or minus 5%. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 124.
88. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 38.
89. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 38.
90. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 38.
91. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 13.
92. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 41-42.
93. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 13.
94. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 42.
95. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 14.
96. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 15-16.
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tice of hiring only persons born in the United States and not hiring
7
persons with temporary work documents.1
The GAO's third report has come under attack by interest
groups9" and most strongly by Senator Alan Simpson. 99 Senator
Simpson cited an internal GAO memo from the GAO's methodology
division, which concluded that the GAO could not link employment
discrimination to the employer sanctions.1 00 The memo outlined two
main flaws in the report. First, the GAO failed to collect any baseline information on the level of employment discrimination that existed before IRCA. Without a baseline measurement, there is no
way to measure whether discrimination has increased, decreased, or
remained static since IRCA's enactment. 10 1 Second, there was no
clear causal link between the discrimination the GAO measured and
the employer sanctions. 102 "Without an increase, it's hard to say
IRCA caused a change, since there's no empirical evidence for it.
It's crucial in this case because discrimination has always been with
'1 03
us - it didn't suddenly arise with IRCA.
This serious flaw seems to undercut the validity of the GAO
report and possibly the state and local studies. This flaw could be
used by interest groups and members of Congress to thwart the repeal of the employer sanctions.
B.

Other State and Local Reports

Several states and localities conducted surveys or hearings to
evaluate IRCA's discriminatory effect. 10 4 Two of the reports cited
most frequently because of their large Hispanic populations were
97. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 43. An estimated 14% of employers reported that
they began this practice. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 43.
98. Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and Federation for American Immigration Reform, for
example.
99. Senator Simpson was an original sponsor of IRCA.
100. 136 CONG. REC. S9806-808 (daily ed. July 17, 1990) (Statement of Sen. Simpson).
101. Id. at S9807.
102. Id. at S9808.
103. Id. GAO Comptroller General Bowsher defended the report, explaining that the
memo responded to a draft of the final report and that the final report was approved by the
methodology division. Id.
104. See ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, SUMMARIZING DATA AND INFORMATION GATHERED ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CAUSED BY ENACTMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986 (Sept. 23, 1988); NEW
YORK STATE INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS, WORKPLACE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986 (Nov. 4, 1988); THE
CITY OF NEW YORK COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TARNISHING THE GOLDEN DOOR: A
REPORT ON THE WIDESPREAD DISCRIMINATION AGAINST IMMIGRANTS AND PERSONS PERCEIVED AS IMMIGRANTS WHICH HAS RESULTED FROM THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986 (Aug. 1989).
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conducted by the New York State Inter-Agency Task Force on Immigration Affairs'0 5 and the California Fair Employment and Housing Commission.' The New York Task Force found that IRCA resulted in "a widespread pattern of discrimination" against those who
are or appear to be foreign.1"7 Employers are adopting practices that
discriminate against foreign residents. 08 The California Commission's report, based on a series of public hearings, found that employer sanctions resulted in a widespread pattern of discrimination in
hiring, firing, terms and conditions of employment, and retaliation.'09
These practices violated IRCA's anti-discrimination provisions and
other state and local laws. IRCA is responsible for "enormous personal and human costs to workers who are or appear to be foreignborn." 110 Combining the GAO report with numerous other state and
local studies conducted prior to the third GAO report, there appears
to be a link between employment discrimination and the employer
sanctions.
VI.

Reasons for IRCA-Related Discrimination

There are several reasons for IRCA-related discrimination: 1) a
lack of employer understanding of the law's major provisions;' 2)
employer uncertainty in determining work eligibility status;"' 3)
prevalence of counterfeit or fraudulent documents that contribute to
employer uncertainty about work eligibility status;"' and 4) judicial
interpretations of the anti-discrimination provision.
Employers' lack of understanding of IRCA's major provisions
leads employers to implement IRCA in a discriminatory manner.""
105. NEW YORK STATE INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION AFFAIRS, IMMIGRATION IN NEW YORK STATE: IMPACT AND ISSUES-THIRD REPORT (Feb. 23, 1990) [hereinafter NEW YORK REPORT].
106. CALIFORNIA FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING COMMISS.ION. PUBLIC HEARINGS ON
THE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS IN CALIFORNIA OF THE EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND ANTIDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT OF 1986 (Jan.
11,1990) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA REPORT].
107. NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 105.
108. NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 105.
109. CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 106.
110. Katherine Bishop, California Says Law on Aliens Fuels Job Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
12, 1990, at Al (quoting CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 106).
Ill. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 60.
112. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 60.
113. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 60.
114. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 60. The GAO excluded the anti-discrimination
provision from the list of major provisions in its survey; a crucial component of IRCA. Interestingly, the percentage of employers understanding this provision fell more than the drop in
employers' understanding of the other three major provisions. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra

note 6. at 20 n.61.
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Employers who do not understand the law discriminate more than
employers who do understand the law. 1 5 This finding is consistent
with the findings in the GAO's second report."' Notably, employers'
17
understanding of the law decreased from 1988 to 1989.1
Employers are confused about the eligibility of employment verification documents.118 The GAO found that less than sixty percent
of employers reported that they understood the employment verification requirements "very clearly" or "generally clearly." 1 9 The multiplicity of acceptable documents is frequently cited as a major cause
of employer uncertainty and confusion. 120 Employers complain that
there are just too many combinations of documents that must be re-

viewed. 12' Numerous documents, and lack of familiarity with them,
can lead employers to reject documents or to demand more documents than required by law. 2 2
The prevalence of counterfeit1 2 1 or fraudulent 24 documents contributes to employment discrimination as well.' 25 Counterfeit and
fraudulent documents add to employers' existing uncertainty concerning the validity of documents. 26 This heightened uncertainty
often leads employers to reject legitimate documents, thereby turning away eligible applicants.1 27 An INS survey indicated that of 900
illegal aliens arrested at work places last year, 233 admitted to having counterfeit Social Security cards arid 142 admitted to having
counterfeit "green cards.' 28 In a series of raids in September 1991,
the INS seized two printing presses and more than 250,000 fake
identity cards. INS officials admit that this is the premier fraud

problem facing the immigration services. 29 Verifying documents is
115. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 63.
116. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 19.
117. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 61; see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 19.
118. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 60. "
119. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 119.
120. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 44.
121. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 67. The GAO found 78% of employers favored
reducing the number of acceptable documents. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 62.
122. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
123. A counterfeit document is one that is illegally manufactured, like a falsified driver's
license. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 66 n.16.
124. A fraudulent document is a genuine document that is illegally used with or without
alterations. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 66 n.16.
125. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 72.
126. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 17.
127. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.
128. Richard W. Stevenson, Fight Is Intensified on Fake Documents for Aliens, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1990, at A8. A "green card" is the common name for a permanent residency
document. Id.
129. Roberto Suro, Boom in Fake Identity Cards for Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1992,
at AI8. To underscore the relative ease in obtaining counterfeit or fraudulent documents, in
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complicated by the relatively large number of acceptable documents13 and the lack of a central verification system.'
Employers, aware of the magnitude of the problem, are fearful
they will be fined if the documents are found to be invalid.13 They
refuse to take the chance of hiring individuals who appear or sound
foreign."' Employers complaint that they are caught between the
threat of discrimination lawsuits and stiff penalties if they hire a person who turns out to be an illegal alien.' 34 Because penalties are high
for employing illegal aliens and discrimination is difficult to prove,
many employers choose not to hire workers who appear foreign; 35
they would rather risk a discrimination complaint than pay the
fines.' 31 Ironically, employers are only required to determine if the
"document reasonably appears on its face to be genuine." 137 An employer who has met this burden is entitled to a "good faith" defense
if it is later determined that the hired person submitted counterfeit
or fraudulent documents.'
Ignorance of the law's provisions and
verification procedures has caused many employers to discriminate
against applicants who appear or sound foreign.
The courts' interpretation of the anti-discrimination provision
has placed a crippling burden on complainants' efforts to successfully
prosecute their claims. When IRCA was enacted, there was a heated
debate concerning the provision's requisite standard of proof.'39 The
debate turned on whether the provision's language required a disparate impact 40 or disparate treatment"" standard of proof.'4 2 A disLos Angeles, CA, a new arrival can buy a green card and a social security card for fifty
dollars. Id.
130. Scott Hodge, ID Cards Would Make a Bad Law Far Worse, NEWSDAY, June 27,
1990, at 63; see supra notes 19-21.
131. Stevenson, supra note 128, at 8. IRCA ordered a study to determine whether the
use of a telephone verification system assisted employers in verifying documents. 8 U.S.C. §
1324 note (1988). The INS completed the initial study in 1987 and has been developing a pilot
program to test the concept. The system would check the data on applicants against a central
data base. Letter from David Simcox to Interested Parties (Mar. 16, 1990), in FEDERATION
FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, MAKING SANCTIONS WORK: THE NEXT THREE YEARS

17 app. (1990).
132. Shawn Pogatchnik, Congress Urged to Adopt Better I.D. for Legal Workers, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 31, 1990, at 18.
133. Id.
134. Tracy Wilkinson, Employers Join Chorus of Immigralion Laws' Critics, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1990, at 27.
135. Scott Hodge, A National Identity Card. Inching Toward Big Brother, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER, May 29, 1990, at 3.
136. Wilkinson, supra note 134, at 27.
137. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(I)(A) (1988).
138. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 17.
139. Carlos A. Gonzales, Note, Standards of Proofin Section 274B of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1323, 1338 (1988).
140. Under a disparate impact standard of proof, the plaintiff must prove that a facially
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parate impact standard of proof substantially reduces the level of
difficulty in proving a discrimination claim, whereas a disparate
treatment standard of proof creates a greater level of difficulty.""3
Upon signing IRCA into law, President Reagan asserted that
the provision's language required a disparate treatment standard of
proof.14 He stated, "Unless the plaintiff presents evidence that the
employer has intentionally discriminated on proscribed grounds, the
employer need not offer any explanation for his employee selection
procedures."' 45 The ALJs"' and courts have adopted President Reagan's position requiring a disparate treatment standard of proof.
In Martinez v. Marcel Watch Corp., 47 the plaintiff, a Puerto
Rican-born citizen of the United States, filed a citizenship discrimination complaint under IRCA against an employer. She alleged that
when she went for an interview, the interviewer continually demanded a green card, which the plaintiff was not required to
carry.""' When she did not produce the card she was turned down
for the job.14 9 The ALJ applied a disparate treatment standard of
proof and held, "Liability under [the anti-discrimination provision]
is proven by a showing of deliberate discriminatory intent on the
part of an employer." 150
The ALJs recognize two methods to prove discriminatory intent
in a disparate treatment case: 5' direct evidence"'5 and indirect or
neutral employment practice had a substantial disparate impact on a protected class of which
the plaintiff is a member. Bendremer & Heiden, supra note 61, at 1041.
141. Under a disparate treatment standard of proof, the plaintiff must prove that the
employer acted with the intent to discriminate. Bendremer & Heiden, supra note 61, at 1041.
142. Bendremer & Heiden, supra note 61, at 1039.
143. Bendremer & Heiden, supra note 61, at 1039.
144. President's Statement of Signing S. 1200 Into Law, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1534, 1535 (Nov. 10, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5856, 5856-2; see also Mark J.
Boulris, Comment, Judicial Deference to the Chief Executive's Interpretationof the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 Antidiscrimination Provision: A Circumvention of Constitutionally Prescribed Legislative Procedure, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1057 (1987) (discussing
the proper role of presidential signing of statements in statutory construction).
145. President's Statement of Signing S. 1200 Into Law, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1534, 1535 (Nov. 10, 1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5856, 5856-2.
146. IRCA-related discrimination complaints are heard by an ALJ who is specially designated by the Attorney General as having special training respecting employment discrimination. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(e)(2) (1988).
147. No. 89200085, 1990 OCAHO LEXIS 14 (May 10, 1990); Valdivia-Sanchez v. Lasa
Marketing Firms, No. 88200061, OCAHO LEXIS 12 (Mar. 14, 1990).
148. Martinez, 1990 OCAHO LEXIS 14, at *10.
149. Id. at *11.
150. Martinez, 1990 OCAHO LExis, at *27. Under the amended IRCA, discrimination
results when an employer requests different documents than are required. 8 U.S.C. §
1324b(a)(6) (1990).
151. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. These two modes are taken from cases
interpreting Title VII cases.
152. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
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circumstantial evidence. 5 3 The ALJs are divided, however, over
which test is proper in IRCA discrimination cases. In Martinez, the
ALJ held that the employer's insistence on a green card, even after
being told by the company president that it was not required for
Puerto Ricans, constituted a prima facie case 154 of discrimination by
direct evidence.' 55 This result contrasts with that in ValdiviaSanchez v. Lasa Marketing Firms.' In Valdivia-Sanchez, a referral firm discriminated against a legal temporary alien when it demanded more documents than required by IRCA.157 The firm refused to refer the plaintiff for employment when she did not produce
the requested documents.1 58 The ALJ conceded that he could have
found direct evidence of discrimination, but he refrained because
IRCA was new and confusing to many employers, especially concerning the eligibility of documents. 5 9 This reasorting for disallowing
direct evidence will most likely fail in a short time; as the ALJs eliminate this "grace period" for employers and hold them accountable
for IRCA's requirements.
The ALJs, using Title VII case law to interpret IRCA's antidiscrimination provision, 6 0 have transposed Title VII's reasonable
care standard of liability to IRCA.'' Liability under this standard
occurs when an employer knows or should have known that illegal
conduct exists in the workplace and fails to exercise reasonable care
to eliminate it.'" 2 Conversely, an employer needs only to exercise
reasonable care in its treatment of employees to escape liability
under IRCA. This decreases the employers' burden of coping with
153. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
154. Martinez v. Marcel Watch Corp., No. 89200085, 1990 OCAHO LEXiS 14, at *33
(May 10, 1990). The allocation of proof has three steps. The plaintiff must first prove a prima
facie case of discrimination. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to establish
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If the defendant carries this burden, the
plaintiff must then prove that this reason is only a pretext for intentional discrimination. Id. at
*30.
155. Id. at *33.
156. Valdivia-Sanchez v. Lasa Marketing Firms, No. 88200061, 1990 OCAHO LExis
12 (Mar. 14, 1990).
157. Id.
158. Id. at *11. The ALJ explained that confusion is not an excuse for discrimination,
but it must be seen in a more "circumstantial" context. Id. at *28 n.l I. Under the amended
IRCA, discrimination results when an employer requests more documents than are required
under the Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(6) (1990).
159. Valdivia-Sanchez, 1990 OCAHO LExIs 12, at *28 n.l .
160. Id. at *22 n.8.
161. Valdivia-Sanchez v. Lasa Marketing Firms, No. 88200061, 1990 OCAHO Lexis
12, at *39 (Mar. 14, 1990).
162. Martinez v. Marcel Watch Corp., No. 89200085, 1990 OCAHO LEXIS 14, at *44
(May 10, 1990).
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IRCA's confusing employer verification system.16 To avoid liability
for IRCA-related discrimination under the reasonable care standard,
an employer must acquire some minimal knowledge of the acceptable documents and treat prospective employees in a fair and consistent manner. 16"
This reasonable care standard is the ALJs' attempt to give employers some leeway in complying with the employment verification
system and its attendant problems."' The presumption in the employer sanction provisions - that a person who submits documents
which reasonably appear genuine on their face is eligible to work166
extends to the anti-discrimination provision. This presumption
could alleviate the incentive for employers to illegally request additional documents or reject acceptable documents.1 6 7
This standard also places a concomitant burden on employers to
learn IRCA's eligibility requirements. Not only will constructive
knowledge give rise to liability under the sanction provisions, but it
will also prove a prima facie case of knowing and intentional discrimination under the anti-discrimination provision.
VII.

The Future of Employer Sanctions

Since the employer sanctions have proved to be an effective deterrent to illegal immigration, 6 8 some members of Congress have indicated reluctance to repeal the employer sanctions. They fear repeal
would open the borders to job-hungry illegal immigrants. 9 Sanction
supporters cite several studies, including the GAO's third report, as
proof that IRCA has reduced illegal immigration and illegal employment.17 The Urban Institute estimated that the number of border
apprehensions between November 1986 and September 1988 declined nearly 700,000, about thirty-five percent below the level that
would be anticipated without IRCA.
Consequently, sanctions are
163.
164.
12, at *41
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at *43.
Valdivia-Sanchez v. Lasa Marketing Firms, No. 88200061, 1990 OCAHO LExIs
(Mar. 14, 1990).
Id. at *40 n.18.
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
Valdivia-Sanchez, 1990 OCAHO LEXIS 12, at *40 n.18.
New Study Finds Small Decline in Illegal Immigration from 1986 Law, DAILY
LABOR REP., Apr. 20, 1990, at A4 [hereinafter New Study].
169. Sam Fulwood, Ill, Immigration Act's Employer Sanctions Likely to Stay Illegal
Aliens, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1990, at 24.
170. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 102-05. The report cited several surveys
and studies indicating that the law has reduced illegal immigration and employment.
171. URBAN INSTITUTE. THE U.S. IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT AND UNDOCUMENTED MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES (PRIP-UI-5) (July 19, 1989).
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commonly justified as an effective deterrent to illegal immigration. 171
Congress 3will be reluctant to repeal a law that seems to be

working.

17

Recent studies and statistics, however, have concluded that
sanctions have done little to stem the flow of illegal immigration.
The Rand Corporation analyzed border patrol arrest statistics, 7 labor market trends,'17 and visa applications 176 in countries that tradi1 77
tionally send large numbers of illegal aliens to the United States.
The report noted an overall "decline in the flow of undocumented

immigrants resulting from employer sanctions over the past three
years, but this decline has not been large."' 7 8 The report concluded,
"For those who expected employer sanctions to halt the flow of undocumented immigrants into the United States in the short run, the
evidence clearly shows that [the] sanctions have not yet been
successful.' 7 9
Border apprehensions were 1,130,000 in 1991, and experts expect that border apprehensions in 1992 will equal or exceed the peak
level recorded before IRCA was enacted in 1986.180 Until this dramatic reversal, border apprehensions had been steadily dropping
since IRCA's enactment.' 8' This upward trend suggests that the
172. New Study, supra note 168, at A4.
173. John Dillin, Repeal Employer Sanctions Senators Say, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 29, 1990, at 6.
174. See infra note 181 and accompanying text.
175. A decline in unauthorized aliens will create a decline in the supply of workers in
labor markets frequented by unauthorized aliens, such as dishwashers or carwashers. New
Study. supra note 168, at A4.
176. If IRCA is deterring illegal immigration, more people will apply for immigration
visas and fewer will request temporary visas. Many people remain in the country after the
temporary visa has expired. New Study, supra note 168, at A4.
177. KEITH CRANE ET AL., THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYER SANCTIONS ON THE FLOW OF
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS TO THE UNITED STATES 2 (Apr. 199C).
178. Id. at 73.
179. Id. at 74. Before Congress enacted IRCA, ten states and Las Vegas had enacted
employer sanction laws. The sanctions produced few results. California and Florida, both with
large Hispanic populations, did not enforce their laws, and the other eight states only generated five convictions from their enforcement efforts. HODGE, supra note 136, at 7.
180. Wayne Cornelius, Perspective on Free Trade; The Scare Stories Don't Work, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1992, at B7. Border apprehensions are considered the most reliable gauge of
illegal alien traffic even though they are skewed by the number of Border Patrol officers and
frequent arrests of the same individual. Jay Mathews, Illegal U.S. Border Crossings From
Mexico on Rise Again, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 1990, at A2.
181. Border apprehensions:
1986-1,600,000
1987-1,122,067
1988-940,670
1989-854,057
1990-1,087,786
1991-1,130,000
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sanctions are not deterring unauthorized aliens from crossing into
the United States.
To strengthen their position, sanction supporters point to a lack
of grass-roots support for repeal, even in the wake of the GAO report and increased apprehensions.' 8 2 Congressional aides cite a lack
of education about the issue as the primary reason for the lackluster
public response.'8 " With illegal immigration concerns out of the
headlines, Americans may feel the sanctions have solved the problem. A Roper Poll released in June 1990 showed that seventy-one
percent of Americans favor employer sanctions.' 8' Sanction supporters also outnumber repeal advocates in Congress. "If we were to
have a vote up or down on employer sanctions, there would be no
support for repeal. The message we're hearing now [from
lawmakers] is to try and fix it before repealing it."' 85 Congress' reluctance to repeal the employer sanctions has forced the debate to
focus on how to "fix" IRCA.
VIII.
A.

Reform Measures

Improve the Employment Verification System

With studies indicating that employers are confused and uncertain about how to verify work eligibility status, improving the employment verification system is a much discussed and controversial
reform measure. To be effective in reducing discrimination, this solution must: (1) greatly reduce the number of work eligibility documents; (2) make documents harder to counterfeit and reduce document fraud; and (3) apply to all members of the work force. 186
The Presidential task force recommended reducing the total
number of documents to seven. 18 7 In addition, it recommended that
Cornelius, supra note 180, at B7; Mathews, supra note 180, at 2; Jerry Seper, INS Got 1.1
Million Aliens in '90, WASH. TIMES, June 18, 1991, at A6.
182. Fulwood, supra note 170, at 24.
183. Fulwood, supra note 170, at 24.
184. THE ROPER ORGANIZATION, SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS: 1990 NATIONAL ROPER
POLL ON IMMIGRATION (June 1990), in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 60 app. 3, at

46.
185. Fulwood, supra note 170, at 24 (quoting Jerry Tinker, staff director to Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs).
186. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 73.
187. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 46-47. The acceptable documents include
the following:
I. United States birth certificate or social security card and a driver's license
issued by a state

2. United States Passport
3. Certificate of Naturalization or Certificate of Citizenship
4. An alien Registration Receipt Card
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the 1-9 should clearly state on its face that the verification process
applies to all employees.1 88 The 1-9 should also state that it is illegal
for an employer to discriminate by treating sore documents as if
they are more acceptable than others or by demanding to see more
or different documents than are required."8
To combat counterfeiting and fraud, the INS recently began issuing a counterfeit, Employment Authorization Document (EAD) to
all work-authorized aliens other than permanent resident aliens. 9 0
The EAD contains a photo, signature, fingerprint of bearer, and
other identification information.' The INS also plans to issue a new
high-tech green card (1-551) for resident aliens.' 9 2 It is machinereadable and electronically stores the image of a photo, fingerprint,
and signature. 1 93 This new green card would eliminate fourteen different forms of the 1-151 and the first version of the 1-551 as acceptable documents. 9 " The INS designed the EAD and the new green
card to be the linchpins of a streamlined documentation system.19 5
However, other employment authorization documents previously
issued by the INS will continue to be honored, and employers will
not be able to specifically ask for either the EAD or green card. 9 6
The process of replacing old work authorization documents with the
new, counterfeit resistant cards will take a substantially long time,
especially to replace the several existing versions of the existing
green card.' 97 This could cause more confusion for employers already overburdened with numerous unfamiliar documents. 98
5. An unexpired foreign passport with attached Form 1-94 authorizing
employment
6. Valid legalization document
7. An unexpired EAD.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 46-47.
188. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 45.
189. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 45.
190. 55 Fed. Reg. 2710 (1990). The EAD is a list "A" document because it establishes
both employment eligibility and identity. Id.
191. Id.
192. 54 Fed. Reg. § 47586 (1989). Like the EAD, the new green card is a list "A"
document.
193. Id. The face of the laminated card will be embossed with raised lines. The card will
contain an optical variable ink pattern that will read "1-551" when the card is tilted at an
angle. Id.
194. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 44-45.
195. Administration Is Opposed to Universal IDs for Work Authorization, INS Commissioner Says, DAILY LABOR REP., July 16, 1990, at A2 [hereinafter Administration Opposed to IDs].
196. 54 C.F.R. § 47586 (1989); 55 Fed. Reg. 2710 (1990).
197. MAKING SANCTIONS WORK, supra note 12, at 17 app.
198. Administration Opposed to IDs, supra note 195, at A2.
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1. National Identification Card.-A logical end point to the
criticism and confusion over the employment verification system is to
adopt a counterfeit-proof national identification card. It will simplify
and secure the verification system, reduce fraud, and alleviate employment discrimination.1 99 A Congressional bill uses this idea as a
means to improve enforcement of the employer sanctions.2"' This bill
calls for a new Social Security card that would be counterfeit proof
and would reliably determine that the person offering the card is
eligible to be employed in the United States. 0 1 The individual would
not be required to carry the card, would not have to show the card
for any purpose except to verify employment under IRCA, and could
withhold the card for any reason other than for proving that the individual is authorized to work in the United States.2 °2 This bill
tracks Senator Moynihan's persistent effort to get an improved Social Security card that would replace the current pasteboard version
and be similar to a credit card.20° Proponents of this card argue that
it could be like a credit card, complete with a magnetic strip containing such information as a Social Security number, date of birth,
and the worker's physical characteristics. 0 4 Some have advocated
using holograms of a card holder's thumbprint to make the cards
20 5
more difficult to falsify.
Although H.R. 2964 calls the card a new Social Security card
and limits its scope, opponents see it as a national identification card
- smacking of Nazi Germany or "Big Brother."20 6 A national identification card needs Big Brother to be effective.20 7 It would require a
"huge data gathering bureau to cross-check every piece of identification. This central bureau would presumably have to record every individual's birth, job changes, address changes, and death, effectively
charting every moment of Americans' lives."' 2 8 Recently, computerRobert Pear, Simpler Plan Sought in Congress to Identify All Eligible for Work,
Mar. 31, 1990, at 1.
200. H.R. 2964, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
201. H.R. 2964, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(2) (1991).
202. H.R. 2964, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)(3) (1991).
203. 136 CONG. REC. S12460-61 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1990) (Statement of Sen. Moynihan). To accomplish this end, Senator Moynihan introduced S. 40 authorizing the development of a prototype of a counterfeit-resistant social security card. S. 40, 102nd Cong., Ist
Sess. (1991).
204. Sam Fulwood, 111, Issue/U.S. Identity Card: Work Document Idea Could Stir
Wide Revolt, LA. TIMES, May 3, 1990, at 5.
205. Id.
206. William Murchison, National Identification Card Raises Specter of Big Brotherism in U.S., TEXAS LAWYER, June 18, 1990, at 27.
207. Hodge, supra note 135, at 8.
208. Hodge, supra note 135, at 8.
199.

N.Y.

TIMES,
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ized data systems have been used for purposes other than that originally intended.2 19 Some examples include:
Social Security Administration files are nov used routinely
to identify "illegal aliens."
The federal Parent Locator Service allows child support enforcement officials to search virtually all government and private
record systems in order to trace absent parents who owe child
support.
Numerous state laws allow or actually require public and
private employers to use criminal history databanks, compiled
originally for police use, in order to screen out applicants convicted of certain crimes, or simply to ascertain if applicants have
arrest records.
Internal Revenue Service records are now used to screen
prospective jurors and to locate non-registrants for the draft.
The records of hundreds of federal and state public assistance programs have been matched against each other and
against public and private employment rolls, to identify people
receiving multiple benefits or benefits for which they are ineligible because of their earnings.21 0
It would be easy and tempting for Congress to attach other conditions or uses to the identification card. "Congress could grant the
Internal Revenue Service the power to hold up or suspend an individual's work permit for allegedly not paying taxes. An outbreak of
infectious disease could bring calls to include an individual's health
information on an identity card. 21' 1 The card could also be used
against political dissenters212 or against students who defaulted on
student loans. It could be used to restrict the employment of convicted felons for certain types of jobs,213 or to combat welfare fraud
by identifying welfare recipients who obtain employment and then
notifying the appropriate agency to cut off benefits.2 14 When the idea
of a national identification card first surfaced during the Reagan administration, an assistant to the President killed the idea when he
compared it to the Nazi's practice of tattooing an identification number on Jews during World War II.215
209. John Shattuck, In the Shadow of 1984: National Identification Systems, Computer-Matching, and Privacy in the United States, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 1000 (1984).
210. Id.
211. Hodge, supra note 135, at 8-9.
212. Murchison, supra note 206, at 27.
213. Shattuck, supra note 209, at 1001.
214. Shattuck, supra note 209, at 1001.
215. Hodge, supra note 135, at 9. The Bush administratior, opposed a national identification card, favoring instead a smaller number of counterfeit-resistant documents. Administra-
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Americans are concerned about an overintrusive government, as
evidenced by their lackluster response to the 1990 census.21 6 Thirtynine percent of American households did not initially return their
census forms." 7 A major reason for the poor response was Americans' distrust of the federal government. 1 8
This national identification card could become a form of a domestic passport.2" 9 The government's police powers to stop and
search are sufficient to transform the identification card into a threat
to an individual's right to privacy.22 0 The United States Supreme
Court has permitted a search of the driver and car when an officer
arrests a motorist for driving without a license. 2 In border searches
and specific checkpoints, the government can stop people without
any particular suspicion of a crime, to request identification, and to
search, detain, or arrest those who cannot produce proper documents.222 Combined with these broad powers to check identification,
a national identification card would allow the government to exercise
these powers frequently and to the fullest extent in the name of immigration, but at the expense of civil liberties. 2 3
A national identification card is a logical measure to help employers verify the eligibility of job applicants, thus reducing discrimination, but the political backlash to such a card will likely defeat its
enactment. Senator Paul Simon summarized by saying, "It does not
offend me to have a national identification card . . . but I don't
' 22
think you can get that passed. That's a political reality." 4
B.

Establish Regional Offices of the Office of Special Counsel

(OSC)
IRCA established the Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practice (OSC) to investigate and
prosecute unfair immigration-related employment practices. 22 5 The
OSC currently has offices only in Washington, D.C., which may not
tion Is Opposed to Universal IDs for Work Authorization, INS Commissioner Says, DAILY
NEWS REP., July 16, 1990, at A2.
216. Barbara Vobejda, Americans Seen Lacking Time, Tolerance for Census Forms,
WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1990, at Al.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Shattuck, supra note 209, at 999.
220. Shattuck, supra note 209, at 999.
221. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
223. Shattuck, supra note 209, at 1000.
224. Pear, supra note 199, at 1.
225. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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be fully accessible to victims of IRCA-related discrimination. 22 8 The
absence of local offices might discourage potential complainants
from seeking assistance.2 27 To remedy this problem, the OSC should
branch out into various regions of the nation. 228 A regional presence
to assist in education, investigations, outreach, and processing of
charges in areas reporting the most discrimination should help reduce discrimination. 229 The GAO reported more IRCA-related discrimination in New York, Chicago, Miami, the Southwest, and the
West than anywhere else in the United States.'" ° Accordingly, the
OSC should establish offices in those cities and in Los Angeles,
Phoenix, and San Francisco to handle the Southwest and West.
Increasing the OSC's visibility and effectiveness by establishing
regional offices, however, is only reacting to the problem instead of
attacking the source of the problem. It could be seen as a band-aid
measure, without significantly reducing the level of discrimination.
An increase in investigations and prosecutions might not deter employers from choosing discrimination over sanctions. Moreover, establishing regional offices and increasing the staff to handle a possible influx of complaints will dramatically increase the OSC's budget.
With record high deficits, Congress might not be willing or able to
provide the funds for expansion.
C.

Increasing Educational and Outreach Activities

Employers are confused or uncertain about the employment verification system2 3 1 and IRCA's major provisions. :' 2 Increasing educational outreach activities to employers and employees about IRCA
will help reduce discrimination. 2 33 There are numerous possible avenues to promote education in this area. First, the Anti-discrimination
Outreach Task Force 3 4 could expand the current toll-free 800 numbers maintained by OSC and INS to include both recorded information and on-line staffed employees to respond to individual ques226. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 24.
227. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 55.
228. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
229. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 25.
230. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 40.
231. See supra note 112.
232. See supra note Ill.
233. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 50.
234. The Task Force is comprised of representatives from the Office of Special Counsel,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of Labor, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, and the Small Business Administration. TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 6, at 54.
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tions.23 5 Second, the Outreach Task Force could develop video and
audio cassette tapes explaining the work verification process and
anti-discrimination provisions." 6 The Outreach Task Force could
also expand the use of public service announcements on radio and
television, as well as use signs, posters, and other printed messages
directed at employees." 7 Finally, it could develop substantial outreach efforts directed at high schools or secondary schools where
there may be little current knowledge about IRCA.238 In a 1990
amendment to IRCA, Congress authorized the OSC and the EEOC
to conduct a campaign to disseminate information concerning the
anti-discrimination provisions.2 9 Congress provided $10 million for
three consecutive fiscal years to fund this campaign. 4 0
Funding for these programs would come from the existing education budgets of OSC and INS. In addition, State Legislation Impact Assistance Grants (SLIAG) provide federal funds to states with
large populations of aliens. 4' An amendment to IRCA242 allows
states to use SLIAG funds to educate the public about the anti-discrimination provision of IRCA. States can use up to $100,000 or one
percent, whichever is greater, of their SLIAG allotment for these
purposes.? a
This reform measure has drawn its share of criticism. Those
who support sanction repeal argue that the money can be better used
for resources other than education."
The additional $10 million
alone authorized by the amendment could add a substantial number
of Border Patrol officers. This increase might stem illegal immigration more effectively than the employer sanctions, without the attendant discrimination. The OSC and INS have expended millions
of dollars and substantial time in developing and implementing educational outreach activities.2" 5 They have aired public service announcements, printed informational posters and brochures, and pub235.
236.

237.
238.
239.
(1990).
240.
241.
242.

TASK
TASK
TASK
TASK

FORCE REPORT,
FORCE REPORT,

supra note 6, at 56.
supra note 6, at 56.

supra note 6, at 56.
supra note 6, at 58.
Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 5054-56 (1990), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(1)
FORCE REPORT,
FORCE REPORT,

Id.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra

note 6, at 55.

Immigration Nursing Relief Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-238 § 6(a), 103 Stat.

2099, 2105 (1989).
243. Id.
244. TASK FORCE

REPORT, supra note 6, at 60 app. 13.
245. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 70. OSC's budget included $1 million for publicizing employer obligations under IRCA's anti-discrimination provision. GAO REPORT, supra
note 2, at 70.
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lished newspaper advertisements in national papers. 246 After several
years of effort, however, employers and employees still do not know
or are uncertain about IRCA's legal requirements. It is better to
eliminate the source of discrimination than to throw money away on
solutions that have already proven unsatisfactory. 4 7
D. Broadening the Department of Labor Power to Enforce
Sanctions
The Department of Labor (DOL) should be given a larger and
continuing role in the enforcement and fashioning of employer sanctions.2 48 Because IRCA is aimed at allowing only eligible workers to
be employed, it as much a labor law as an immigration law.249 Currently, the INS and the Department of Justice have total responsibility for implementing IRCA.2 50 The DOL conducts routine on-site
inspections, in conjunction with its labor standards investigations, to
determine compliance with IRCA's paperwork requirements. 5 1 If a
DOL inspector uncovers a violation, it is reported to the INS. The
INS then decides whether action is warranted. This process leads to
duplicated recordkeeping, inefficiency, and missed compliance opportunities. 252 The DOL, unlike the INS, has a well recognized, long
established, and accepted role in the American workplace.2 53 Many
employers and employees outside the Southwest find it odd that the
INS, viewed as a border/immigration control force, should be involved in enforcing workplace laws and regulations. 5 ' The DOL has
regional and field offices across the United States to effectively assume primary responsibility for employer sanction enforcement.25 5
This would create more uniformity and increase the level of
enforcement. '
246.
247.
248.
REPORT,

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
REPORT,

254.
255.
256.

GAO

note 2, at 68.
supra note 6, at 60 app. 13.
Letter from Sen. Edward Kennedy to John Dunne (Apr, 25, 1990), in TASK FORCE
supra note 6, at 60 app. 3, at 90.
Id.
Id.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 48.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 48.
Letter from Sen. Edward Kennedy to John Dunne (Apr. 25, 1990), in TASK FORCE
supra note 6, at 60 app. 3, at 90.
Id.
Id.
Id.
REPORT, supra
TASK FORCE REPORT,
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E. Strengthening the Anti-Discrimination Provision
Despite recent ALJ decisions and an amendment in 1990,257
there are several areas that IRCA does not cover, referred to earlier
in the Comment.25 These holes could be plugged. Strengthening this
provision is not a solution, however, to the cause of discrimination. It
is only a response to the widespread discrimination being exercised
by employers.
F. Sending Foreign Aid to Countries That Send Aliens to the
United States
This reform measure attempts to accomplish what the employer
sanctions were designed to do: reduce the incentive to seek illegal
employment in the United States.259 Increasing foreign aid and other
support to developing countries to provide employment opportunities
for their citizens will decrease the incentive for aliens to emigrate to
the United States.2 60 The sharp increase in border apprehensions is a
sign of the continued weakness of the economy in Latin American
countries, particularly Mexico.261 This economic weakness has
prompted many more workers to come to the United States. 26 2 S.
1734263 attacks this problem by calling for negotiations with Mexico
and Canada," 4 in which the Attorney General and the Secretary of
State would establish a formal bilateral program. The program
would prevent and prosecute the smuggling of unauthorized aliens
into the United States.265
Continued negotiations with Mexico for a free trade agreement
are another positive step. A free trade agreement might improve
257. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 5054-56 (1990). This amendment contained several
provisions to strengthen the anti-discrimination provisions. These included the following: Inclusion of seasonal agricultural workers within the scope of the anti-discrimination protections;
elimination of the requirement that aliens file a declaration of intention to become a citizen in
order to file an anti-discrimination complaint; anti-retaliation protections for employees who
file an anti-discrimination complaint; treating certain documentary practices as discrimination;
conforming civil money penalties for anti-discrimination violations to those for the employer
sanctions; providing dissemination of information concerning the anti-discrimination
protections.
258. See supra part IV.A.I.
259. Letter from Conrad Harper to John Dunne (June 15, 1990), in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 60 app. 3, at 34.
260. Id.
261. Patrick McDonnell, S.D. Border Arrests Hit 3-Year High, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 5,
1990, at 2.
262. Id.
263. S. 1734, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
264. S. 1734, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1991).
265. Id.
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Mexico's economic situation, thus reducing the incentive for unau266
thorized aliens to illegally enter the United States seeking jobs.
This "developmental approach," such as the free trade agreement,
would make Mexican wages more comparable with United States
wages. A four to one wage gap, as opposed to the current eight to
one wage gap, would be enough to reduce the flow to the United
States.267
However, this is a weak and indirect solution to ending employment discrimination. The United States has sent billions of dollars in
foreign aid to the developing countries in the Western Hemisphere
over the years, but it has produced minimal economic benefits. A
similar approach has been taken to stem the flow of illegal drugs, but
it has not proved to be as effective as expected.2Es
IX.

The Case for Repeal

A Wall Street Journal editorial referred to ][RCA as "the first
legislation since Jim Crow where the government is so closely aligned with a process that produces discrimination. It is the modern
era's Prohibition - a misguided attempt to 'control the borders.' "269
The most effective way to eliminate IRCA-related discrimination is
to repeal the employer sanctions. There are two logical arguments
for repealing the employer sanctions. First, the sanctions have not
slowed the number of illegal aliens entering the United States. Second, continued discrimination against individuals who appear or
sound foreign, but who are actually United States citizens, is intolerable and contrary to the country's commitment 1.0 civil rights.
IRCA was designed to slow the overwhelming number of illegal
aliens crossing into the United States. It has failed. Reports now indicate illegal immigration has risen sharply to pre-IRCA levels.2 7
Without a showing of reduced illegal immigration, there is no justifiable public policy reason for keeping ineffective sanctions that are
causing widespread discrimination. The sanctions have lost their
public policy underpinnings.
With numerous reports indicating a widespread pattern of
266. Al Kamen, Mexicans Undeterred By Barriers on the Bo,,der, WASH. POST, Feb. 18,
1992, at Al.
267. Id.
268. Michael Isikoff, World Output of Narcotics Soars, Congress Told, WASH. POST,
Mar. 2, 1990, at A24; Peter D. Moore, Looking Ahead: The Drug War's Other Agenda, L.A.
TIMES, June 27, 1990, at 3.
269. Clocking Immigration Sanctions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1990, at 12.
270. See Seper, supra note 181, at A6.
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IRCA-related discrimination, Congress must evaluate its commitment to civil rights. Continued enforcement of the employer sanctions will lead to continued human indignities and economic hardship for many Americans, especially Hispanics and AsianAmericans.171 Congress should not be hypocritical in allowing
IRCA-related discrimination to continue while resting on its laurels
regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989272 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1991.27 Congress should not give the public the
impression that it endorses discrimination as long as it is confined to
Hispanics and Asian-Americans. Even if the sanctions were reducing
illegal immigration, no public policy objective justifies massive employment discrimination. 7 4
The above-mentioned reform measures are weak and indirect.
Reducing the number of acceptable documents will not diminish the
discriminatory practices of many unscrupulous employers. 7" Moreover, the GAO estimates this process will take almost five years to
implement.2 76 This is an unacceptable time period for those individuals experiencing the humiliation and hardship of discrimination. A
national identification card is repugnant to Americans with strong
traditions for civil liberties. Fears of "Big Brother" and possible government abuse are justified. In addition, a counterfeit-proof social
security card would cost approximately one billion dollars to develop
and distribute.2 77
Public education will not eliminate IRCA-related discrimination. It will not deter discrimination because the risk of sanctions
will still exist. The INS and DOL have expended tremendous
amounts of time and money for the past several years to educate
employers and employees. It has not prevented discrimination. In
271. 136 CONG. REC. S8896 (daily ed. June II, 1990) (Statement of Sen. Cranston).
The GAO found Hispanics and Asian-Americans suffered the most harm from IRCA-related
discrimination. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
272. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 1991). The law prohibits discrimination against
the disabled in employment, public accommodations, transportation, and telecommunications.
It guarantees, for example, that the disabled be treated equally in employment and that they
be given easy access to office buildings, stores, restaurants, buses, and stadiums. Gaylord
Shaw, Knocking Down a Barrier: Bush Signs Americans with Disabilities Act, NEWSDAY,
July 27, 1990, at 7.
273. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991)).
274. Employer Sanctions Don't Work, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1990, at A19.
275. Scrap Immigration Act's Backfiring Sanctions: The Victim's View, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 1990, at 32.
276. Id.
277. Letter from Sen. Orrin Hatch to Attorney General Dick Thornburg (July 31,
1990), in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 60 app. 1, at 88.
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fact, employers are more confused about IRCA now then in the year
it was passed.
Expanding the OSC and the anti-discrimination provision is a
band-aid approach to the problem. It will never catch up to all of the
sanction-driven discrimination.2 78 Senator Kennedy summed up the
problem by stating, "We aimed at illegal aliens - but we hit lawabiding Americans, and it is time to rectify our mistake. 2' 79
To replace IRCA, Congress could use the budgeted funds to
increase the Border Patrol and the facilities at. frequented border
crossing points. This is the approach the Bush administration is currently taking. Attorney General Barr recently announced a new
multi-million dollar plan that calls for new border lights, fences, and
150 additional Border Patrol guards.2"'
A current Senate bill281 seeks to repeal IRCA's employer sanction and anti-discrimination provisions and in replace of these provisions, the bill seeks to strengthen enforcement of the border.28 2 Combining increased border enforcement with a developmental approach
to bolster Mexico's economy might better safeguard America's
borders.
X.

Conclusion

IRCA marked a fundamental shift in strategy to combat overwhelming numbers of illegal immigrants entering the United States.
The cornerstone of IRCA is employer sanctions, which prohibit employers from hiring unauthorized aliens, at the risk of incurring substantial civil and criminal penalties. The strategy has backfired, however, causing widespread discrimination against individuals who may
appear or sound foreign, instead of reducing the flow of illegal immigrants. Reform measures have included improving the employment
verification system, expanding the OSC, increasing education and
outreach activities, broadening the powers of the DOL, strengthening the anti-discrimination provision, and increasing foreign aid to
economically weak Western Hemisphere countries. These reforms do
not attack the problem at its source. Only repeal of the employer
sanctions will eliminate this unjustified discrimination.
Michael Crocenzi
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

136 CONG. REC. S8893 (daily ed. June 27, 1990) (Statement of Sen. Hatch).
136 CONG. REC. S8893 (daily ed. June 27, 1990) (Statement of Sen. Kennedy).
Kamen, supra note 266, at Al.
S. 1734, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
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